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  We investigate the dynamics of a cobweb model with heterogeneous beliefs, 
generalizing the example of Brock and Hommes (1997). We examine situations 
where the agents form expectations by using either rational expectations, or a type 
of adaptive expectations with limited memory defined from the last two prices. We 
specify conditions that generate cycles. These conditions depend on a set of factors 
that includes the intensity of switching between beliefs and the adaption parameter. 
We show that both Flip bifurcation and Neimark-Sacker bifurcation can occur as 
primary bifurcation when the steady state is unstable. 
 
JEL Codes: C62, D84, E30. 
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1.  Introduction  
In relation to economic modeling, there has been a lengthy and 
continuing debate about formation of expectations. Although the rational 
expectations hypothesis plays a major role in dynamic macroeconomic 
research, papers that model expectations relaxing that assumption are 
increasing, but few of these investigate the dynamics in some detail. The 
cobweb model of Brock and Hommes (1997) first gave a satisfying 
exposition on both accounts, i.e. a rigorous foundation of heterogeneous 
beliefs and a systematic dynamical study. The expectation formation 
arises from a rational choice between various costly forecasts. The 
concept of adaptively rational equilibrium dynamics (ARED) in which 
the market equilibrium dynamics is coupled to the choice of prediction 
of learning strategies is introduced. Brock and Hommes then showed 
that this type of expectation formation can generate inherent instability 
for the ARED leading to possible complex motions. The present paper 
further develops this approach by considering a different set of forecasts 
and aims at characterizing such instability.  
 
Over the past decade, a growing number of papers have dealt with the 
role of heterogeneous expectations in generating instability (Chiarella 
and He, 1998, 2001; Franke and Neseman, 1999; Goeree and Hommes, 
2000; Hommes, 1991). While economic implications of these studies are  5
obvious for some specific markets,
1 most papers, including ours, are 
based on the simple cobweb model as it is one of the most tractable 
models involving market dynamics. 
 
The framework and the economic import of these papers, including ours, 
are close to those of Brock and Hommes
2 (1997).  
Let us first consider the framework. Expectation formation is modeled 
as a rational economic decision. Indeed, producers choose between two 
methods of predicting prices depending on their performance, namely a 
costly sophisticated predictor and a costless unsophisticated predictor.
3 
The predictor’s performance is defined as the net realized profits in the 
most recent period less the cost associated with the predictor. Depending 
on this performance, each producer may at every period switch from a 
predictor to another. For producers as a whole, this switching process, 
which is perfectly endogenous, may occur at various levels of intensity. 
Let us now turn to the economic meaning of this class of models (Brock 
and Hommes, 1997; Branch, 2002; Lasselle et al., 2003). Under the 
                                                 
1 See for instance Frankel and Froot (1990) for concerns related to the Foreign 
Exchange Market. 
2 See also Brock and Hommes (1995). 
3 A basic but necessary assumption used in the literature on this topic is the local 
instability of the steady state when all agents use the cheap predictor.  6
previous assumptions on the expectation formation and the ARED 
concept, the instability of the steady state is generated by a simple but 
powerful mechanism which can be intuitively described as follows. 
On the one hand, when the price is close to its steady-state value, very 
few agents use the most sophisticated predictor since its cost exceeds the 
benefits of its forecast. Therefore, the distance between the current price 
and its steady-state value grows large over time. 
On the other hand, while its cost is significant, the sophisticated 
predictor provides a better net return when the current price is far from 
its steady-state value. Thus, the distance between both prices gets 
smaller over time.  
Let us illustrate this mechanism
4 in the model of Brock and Hommes 
(1997). Suppose that at time t the current price is close but greater than 
its steady-state value and the vast majority of agents use the naïve 
expectations predictor. As a result, the supply in t + 1 is mainly 
evaluated from  t p , but the demand is computed from the current price 
in t + 1. As the dynamics in the cobweb model is inherently oscillatory, 
the current price in t + 1 will be less than the steady-state value. The 
same reasoning is true for the following period. The current price in t + 
2 will be greater than its steady-state value.  7
Consequently, price oscillations are endogenously generated in the 
steady-state neighborhood.  
The immediate steps in research can then be either to look for stability 
conditions for convergence of the price dynamics and their 
consequences in the model as did Branch (2002), or to characterize the 
steady state instability as pioneered by Brock and Hommes (1997). It is 
indeed well known that any complete dynamical analysis should begin 
with that characterization as it can lead to complicated dynamical 
phenomena studied from bifurcation. When a bifurcation occurs, the 
qualitative properties of the dynamical system in the vicinity of the 
steady state have been modified following a small change in value of 
one of the parameters of the model. At the critical value of the 
parameter, there exists one steady state. However, if the parameter 
increases beyond that critical value, even if the perturbation is small, 
then there exist cycles.  
Brock and Hommes (1997) showed that the above described mechanism 
could lead to highly complex dynamics. They focused on a bifurcation 
route to chaos. On this route, the primary bifurcation can only be a Flip 
bifurcation, i.e. the equilibrium time paths exhibit attracting cycles of 
period two.  
                                                                                                                      
4 Brock used the Samuelson’s boat parable to illustrate this mechanism (refer to 
Brock’s interview by Woodford (2000)).  8
 
The main contribution of our paper is to show that this mechanism can 
lead to the possibility of not only stable cycles of period two, but also 
attracting limit cycles through primary bifurcations. Indeed, we show 
that when the steady state is unstable, supercritical Flip bifurcation as 
well as supercritical Neimark-Sacker bifurcation can occur for a set of 
parameters. The existence of these two types of attracting cycles is 
directly linked to our definition of the expectation functions.  
 
While Brock and Hommes (1997) assume that costly rational 
expectations are competing with costless naïve expectations, we replace 
the latter by costless adaptive expectations. More precisely, we assume 
that adaptive expectations are a weighted average of the last two prices. 
Such a relationship, which is crucial for our results, is a reasonable 
alternative possibility to those relationships assumed by Brock and 
Hommes (1997) and by Branch (2002), for instance. It was already 
present in Hommes’s cobweb model (1998) with homogenous and 
adaptive expectations.
5 Allowing for adaptive expectations, we consider 
its implications using the evolutionary framework of Brock and 
Hommes (1997).
6 
                                                 
5 There is no endogenous switching process, the supply curve is non linear. 
6 A similar formulation is also used in the cobweb model of Chiarella and He (1998).  9
The costless adaptive predictor used by us is more sophisticated than the 
naïve one but is still relatively unsophisticated.  It may be a reasonable 
forecasting strategy for boundedly rational agents in some situations,
7 
such as those in which the marginal expected gains from more refined 
prediction methods exceeds the extra cost of these. According to 
proponents
8 of Bounded Rationality Theory, such as Simon (1957) or 
Baumol and Quandt (1964), it may be justified as follows. First, as 
suggested by Simon (1957), individuals have a limited capacity to store 
and process information. They can loose or forget information quickly. 
We can then imagine that beyond two periods they don’t keep the 
information about prices. Second, agents could also believe that the 
prices observed more than two periods ago will have no impact (or so 
little) impact on future prices that it is not necessary to take account of 
that information. Third, one could conjecture that the extra-cost in 
keeping and taking that information into account would exceed the extra 
                                                 
7 The reference to bounded rationality is quite common in the literature on 
heterogeneous expectations. See for instance Tisdell (1996) or Hommes (2000). 
8 The type of rational economic decision-making underlying our model is more akin to 
that of Baumol and Quandt than to that of Simon.  The former treats the problem as an 
optimizing one.  The latter considers it as a ‘satisficing’ one.  However, our model 
includes elements of both ideas.    10
benefit to be obtained. Therefore, it would be “economically rational” 
not to take these earlier prices into account in the prediction function.  
 
Given the existing literature derived from Brock and Hommes (1997), 
our model allows us to derive two new results. 
First, the model of Brock and Hommes (1997) becomes a special case of 
our model. Indeed, the naïve expectations they consider correspond to 
our adaptive expectations when all weight is put on the most recent 
price. As we consider an expectation function with two lags, the 
dimension of the dynamical system of our model increases from 2 to 3. 
Due to this change, we are able to demonstrate the existence of a new 
type of primary bifurcation, namely a primary Neimark-Sacker 
bifurcation.
9 
Second, our conclusion is more cautious than that of Branch (2002). 
Branch (2002) considers a more generalized setting than Brock and 
Hommes (1997) and us. Indeed, he examines in detail the stability 
properties of the cobweb model when agents can choose between three 
predictors: the rational expectations predictor, the naïve predictor and 
adaptive beliefs. In pages 77-78, he studies a model close to ours where 
agents choose between a costly predictor and a costless adaptive 
                                                 
9 See Proposition 3. For a mathematical exposition of bifurcations, we refer to 
Kuznetsov (2000).  11
predictor defined as a weighted average of the most recent price and the 
most recent forecast. This scheme requires as much memory as our 
scheme based on a weighted average of the two most recent prices. One 
of his main conclusions (Theorem 8, p. 77) states that the stability 
conditions of the steady state are broader when adaptive expectations 
put “enough” weight on the past. As our model is simpler than his, our 
conclusion is more specific. First, the stability zone is wider when the 
agents base their adaptive expectations on both past prices with more 
weight on the most recent price. In other words, the ‘size’ of the stability 
region is non-monotonic in the adaption parameter. Second, the 
instability of the steady state may lead to stable cycles. On the one hand, 
these cycles may appear when the agents put “enough” weight on the 
current price (cycles occurring through a Flip bifurcation). On the other 
hand, stable cycles can also occur when the agents put “reduced” weight 
on the most recent price (cycles occurring through the Neimark-Sacker 
bifurcation).  We conclude that the adaptive predictor is stabilizing 
relative to naïve expectations and there exists a critical parameter value 
related to the switching process which can induce a bifurcation 
regardless of the weight on past information in the adaptive predictor.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The cobweb model and its dynamics 
under rational versus adaptive expectations are presented in Section 2.  12
The stability conditions of the steady state and of periodic equilibria are 
stated in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The Cobweb Model with Rational vs. Adaptive Expectations  
We present an extension of the model of Brock and Hommes (1997) that 
focuses on the case of rational versus naïve expectations. The only two 
changes to their framework are the following. On the one hand, we 
consider the introduction of an adaptive expectation function with two 
lags rather than naïve expectations. On the other hand, the analysis is 
based on the relative number of agents using rational expectations 
compared to the number of agents using adaptive expectations, denoted 
by  1 n . Although the second change is just a matter of presentation, the 
first change, through small, leads to significant differences in results. To 
make the results comparable with these of Brock and Hommes (1997), 
we follow closely their setup.  
 
Supply decisions are made by choosing the output that maximizes 
expected profits subject to the one-period production lag. That is,  
() [ ] q c q p
e
t q − +1 max             
where  () q c  is the cost function which is increasing in q.   13
Price expectations,  e
t p 1 + , are formed by choosing a predictor from a set 
of expectation functions. Given this heterogeneity in expectation 
formation, market supply is a weighted sum of the supply decisions of 
the heterogeneous agents. The weights are simply the proportion of 
agents using a specific predictor. That is, in our model each agent 
chooses between two predictors, i.e.  { } 2 1, H H H j ∈  where each 
predictor depends upon a vector of past prices  ( ) 0 1 p , , p , p P t t t …
 
− = . 
The fractions of agents using one of the two predictors,  () ( ) 1 , , − t t t j P p n
 
H  
depend on the current price and on the vectors of previous predictors: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2 1 1 1 , − − − = t t t P H P H P
     
H .  































1 , 1 ,
j
t j t t t j t P H S P p n p D H  
where  () . D  is the demand function and  () . S  is the supply function. 
To keep the model analytically tractable, we assume linear demand and 
supply. Therefore let  ( ) t t p B F p D − =  be the demand and 
() () ( ) t j t j P H b P H S
   
= , with  + ∈R b B F , , . 
Without loss of generalization to the stability properties, we set F equal 
to zero. Market equilibrium is determined by the condition 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t t t t t P H S n P H S n p D
   
2 , 2 1 , 1 1 + = +                                             (1)  14











t t p P H  with cost  0 ≥ C ,                                               (2) 
() 1 2 1 −
→








t t t p p P H τ τ  with  1 0 < <τ  and no cost.          (3) 
Each period, after observing the new price and assessing the accuracy of 
their forecasts, producers update their prediction of next period’s price. 
The evolution of the proportion of agents using a particular predictor is 
given by  
()( ) 1 ,
2
1
1 , 1 , +
=
+ + ∑ = t j
j
t j t j U Exp U Exp n β β .                                  (4) 
1 + t , j U  is a measure of the welfare associated with a certain predictor. 
The variable β parameterizes preferences over profits. The larger the β, 
the more likely a producer will switch to an expectation with slightly 
higher returns. Brock and Hommes call this the “intensity of choice” 
parameter. Assume that the measure of the welfare is equal to realized 
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1 1 H π .   15
j C  is the fixed cost associated with  j H . The cost of production is a 
simple quadratic cost function  () ( ) b q q c 2 2 = . The profit functions for 
producers using each predictor are respectively: 
() C p
b
p p t t t − = + + +
2
1 1 1 1 2
, π                                                                       (5) 
() () []() () [] 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1
2
, , − + − − + − + − − + = t t t t t t t t p p p p p
b
p p p τ τ τ τ π         (6)  




1 1 1 2











⎛ − = t t t , Z C p
b
n β                                                    (7) 
() []() () [] 1 1 1 1 1 , 2 1 2 1
2






⎧ − + − − + = t t t t t t t Z p p p p p
b
n τ τ τ τ β  (8) 





1 , 1 Exp t j t Z π β  and  1 1 2 1 1 = + + + t , t , n n .  
The cobweb model with rational and adaptive expectations is a system 
(S) of non-linear difference equations that governs the law of motion of 
price (9) and the law of motion of the proportion of agents using the 
rational expectation predictor (10): 
( ) t , t t t n , p , p p 1 1 1 − + =φ                                                                (9) 
( ) t , t t t , n , p , p n 1 1 1 1 − + =ϕ                                                            (10) 
where   16
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 1 , 1 , 1 1 1 , , − − − + = t t t t t t p p n A n p p τ τ φ ,  
( ) ( ) ( ) t , t , t , n b B n b n A 1 1 1 1 + − = , and 
()
() () () () [] {} ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣





















Since (9) and (10) are respectively a second-order difference equation 
and a first-order difference equation, the system (S) can be rewritten as a 
system of three first-order difference equations (S’):  
t t p h = +1                           (11)
  ( ) t , t t t n , p , h p 1 1 φ = +                         (12)
  ( ) t , t t t , n , p , h n 1 1 1 ϕ = +                        (13) 
 
The stability or the instability of the steady state issued from the system 
(S’) formed by the equations (11), (12), and (13) can be directly 
investigated by looking at the Jacobian matrix of (S’) taken at the steady 
state. These stability properties will be studied in the following section. 
 
3. Stability and Cycles 
A simple computation shows that the system (S’) has a unique steady 
state  () ( ) [ ] () C n E β β Exp 1 1 , 0 , 0 1 + = = . To ease the presentation, let us  17
assume that  0 = C  or  1 = C . When  0 = C , the agents have free access 
to the sophisticated predictor.  
 
Remark: () () 0 1 < ∂ ∂ β β n A (The proof is left to the reader.) 
 
Proposition 1 
Assume that the slopes of the supply and the demand satisfy  1 > B b . 
When the information costs are nil, the steady state is 
() () 2 1 , 0 , 0 1 = = β n E  and is always locally asymptotically stable.  
The proof is left to the reader. 
 
Proposition 2 (Local Stability of the Steady-State) 
Let  1 > B b  and  1 = C . There exists a unique  ( ) ( ) β 1 , 0 , 0 n E = , where 
() ( ) β β Exp n + = 1 1 1  with the following properties: 
i)  1 β ∃  such that : 
(a) for all  1 0 β β < ≤  and  1 3 2 < < ∀ τ , E is locally asymptotically 
stable.   
(b) for all  1 β β >  and  1 3 2 < < ∀ τ , E is locally unstable.   
ii)  2 β ∃  such that : 
(a) for all  2 0 β β < ≤  and  ( ) ( ) 3 2 , 2 1 2 1 , 0 ∪ ∈ ∀τ , E is locally 
asymptotically stable.    18
(b) for all  2 β β >  and  ( ) ( ) 3 2 , 2 1 2 1 , 0 ∪ ∈ ∀τ , E is locally unstable.   
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Proposition 3 (Primary Bifurcations of the Steady-State) 
Let  1 > B b  and  1 = C .  
(i) Fix  1 3 2 < <τ . When  1 β β = , the system undergoes a supercritical 
Flip bifurcation. 
(ii) Fix  () () 3 2 , 2 1 2 1 , 0 ∪ ∈ τ . When  2 β β = , the system undergoes a  
Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. Moreover, the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation 
is supercritical on some  ( ) ( ) 3 2 , 2 1 2 1 , 0 ∪ ∈ τ .  
(iii) When  2 1 = τ , the system is in strong resonance 1:3. 
(iv) When  3 2 = τ , the system undergoes a codim-2 bifurcation. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
The dynamical analysis depends on a set of parameters composed of the 
adaption parameter τ, the intensity of choice β, and the slopes of the 
demand and the supply B and b. For specific combinations of these 
parameters, the steady state can lose its stability giving birth to periodic 
equilibria, that is to say the system undergoes a primary bifurcation and 
stabilizing fluctuations in prices can appear. We are able to prove 
analytically when these bifucations arise.   19
  
Our propositions enlighten the complex relationship between the 
adaption parameter and the intensity of choice in the cobweb model with 
rational vs. adaptive expectations. On the one hand, as we shall see in 
some of our forthcoming illustrations, there is a non-monotonic relation 
between the ‘size’ of the stability region of the steady state and the 
adaption parameter, i.e. a higher weight on the most recent price won’t 
necessary lead to a larger stability region. Indeed, beyond some critical 
values of the intensity of choice, as more weight is placed on the most 
recent information, the former must decrease or else the steady state will 
become locally unstable. In other words, the speed of the movement 
from one predictor to the other predictor is balanced with the adaption 
parameter. On the other hand, for specific values of the intensity of 
choice, regardless of the weight on past information in the adaptive 
predictor, stable cycles in prices can appear.  
Consequently, the substitution of naïve expectations by adaptive 
expectations in the cobweb model with heterogeneous expectations can 
not only create a more stable environment but also foster the possibility 
of stabilizing cycles.  
 
The following figures illustrate our propositions and facilitate the 
understanding of our findings.   20
Figures 1 and 2 show how the stability of the steady state depends on the 
parameters values. Up to three curves are drawn: the eigen curve (lighter 
thick curve), the flip curve (darker thick curve), and the NS curve (light 
thick curve). On each curve, β  is at its critical value to which is 
associated a specific value of τ . The eigen curve consists of parameter 
values for which the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the 
unique steady state change from real to complex. The flip curve consists 
of parameter values for which one of the eigenvalues is equal to –1. It   
represents the possibility of Flip bifurcation as a primary bifurcation. 
The NS curve consists of parameter values for which complex 
eigenvalues have modulii equal to 1. It represents the possibility of 
Neimark-Sacker bifurcation as a primary bifurcation. The flip curve and 
the NS curve intersect when  3 2 = τ . Finally, the unique steady state is 
locally asymptotically stable in the shaded region, all the modulii of the 




In Figure 1 the three curves are plotted in the  ( ) [ ] ( ) β τ 1 , n A  plane. We 
choose  () [] β 1 n A  for the vertical axis for two reasons. On the one hand, 
this coefficient allows us to distinguish the two areas where the non zero  21
eigenvalues are either real or complex. On the other hand, it is the 
coefficient in the law of motion of the prices.  
We can point out two facts. First, whatever the value of the adaption 
parameter, the steady state can be asymptotically stable, but the ‘size’ of 
the stability of the region is non-monotonic in τ. Second, the system can 
undergo a bifurcation, but the possibility of primary bifurcation rests on 
specific values between τ  and β. Indeed the two parameters are jointly 
dependent, i.e. to the critical value of the intensity of choice corresponds 
a specific value of the adaptive parameter. Let us develop these facts 




Figure 2 illustrates the non-monotonic relationship between β and τ. It 
plots the flip and NS curves in the ( ) τ β, -plane for specific values of 
the parameters of the demand and the supply,  3 . 0 = B  and  35 . 1 = b . It 
shows overall that the adaptive expectations (when  ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ τ ) are less 
destabilizing for the market than the naïve expectations ( 1 = τ ).  
Whatever the value of the adaption parameter, the unique steady state 
can be locally asymptotically stable for small values of the intensity of 
choice. But as the intensity of choice is increasing, there is a need of a  22
more balanced weighting between the two prices to ensure this stability. 
Note that this ‘more’ balanced weighting is not a complete balanced 
one. Indeed the most recent information must count for around 2/3 in the 
adaptive expectations function. So our evolutionary framework adds a 
new feature. There exists a favorable trade-off between information and 
the speed of movement between the predictors. More balanced 
information captured on each side of the steady state can increase the 
speed of movement between predictors without destabilizing the market. 
 
To illustrate this main point of our paper, let us apply the mechanism 
described in the introduction here. To begin with, let us remind 
ourselves of three facts. First, the instability in the cobweb model is 
characterized by oscillations around its unique steady state. Second, our 
cheap predictor rests on two periods, so it captures the most recent 
information on each side of this unique steady state. Third, adaptive 
expectations dampen the oscillations.  
Now suppose that at time t the current price is close but greater than its 
steady-state value and a vast majority of agents use the adaptive 
expectations predictor. The supply in t + 1 is mainly evaluated from  t p  
and  1 − t p , but the demand is computed from the current price in t + 1. As 
the dynamics in the cobweb model is inherently oscillatory, the current 
price in t + 1 will be less than the steady-state value. But it will be  23
higher than if naïve expectations were the costless predictor. The same 
reasoning is true for the following period. The current price in t + 2 will 
be greater than its steady-state value, but less than the value which can 
be found if naïve expectations were the costless predictor. Consequently, 
price oscillations are more dampened in our model in the steady-state 
neighborhood. The second parameter of our model, the intensity of 
choice, which inherently fosters divergent dynamics in the model, can 
then increase without damaging the stability. We may say that the 
process of switching predictors in this model enhances stability of the 
model.  
 
As we shall see in the following figures, as the set of parameters varies, 
the local stability of the steady state can be transformed and for fixed 




Figure 3 assembles several graphs and illustrates Proposition 3(ii). 
Notably, we can see a limit cycle for specific values of the parameters in 
the  () ( ) () t p , t p 1 − -plane (recall  ( ) ( ) t h t p = −1 ). The initial conditions are 
2 . 0 0 = h ,  1 0 = p  and  5 . 0 0 , 1 = n , the parameters are as follows: τ = 
0.628, β = 2.11272, C = 1, B = 0.3, b = 1.35.   24
 
One could then wonder what happens to the dynamics of the current 
price  t p  or those of the current proportion of agents using the rational 
expectations predictor  t n , 1  when the intensity of choice β  increases (for 
a given τ).  
 
Let us first consider a value of τ greater than  3 2 . Figures 4a and 4b 
show the bifurcation diagrams of  p  (4a) and  1 n  (4b) with respect to β  
for a fix value of τ   () 8 . 0 = τ . As β  increases between 1.5 and 10, the 
system can undergo a variety of period-doubling. The primary 
bifurcation occurs around  18 . 1 = β . The unique steady state in prices 
loses its stability and becomes a cycle of period two, the uniqueness of 
1 n  can disappear. As β  takes higher values, there is a possibility of 
periodic attractors. 
 
Figure 4a, Figure 4b 
  25
Let us now consider a lower value of τ   ( ) 6 . 0 = τ  and assess the 
dynamical behaviour of our variables as β takes larger and larger 
values.
10   
Figure 4c, Figure 4d 
 
Figures 4c and 4d show the bifurcation diagrams of  p  (4c) and  1 n  (4d) 
with respect to β . As β  increases between 1.5 and 10, the system can 
undergo a variety of bifurcation. The primary bifurcation occurs around 
94 . 1 = β . The unique steady state in prices loses its stability and 




For large values of β , there is a possibility of periodic attractors as 
illustrated in the graphs assembled in Figure 5. From these graphs, we 
can note that the switch from the sophisticated predictor to the cheap 
                                                 
10 Similar behaviour can be observed for lower values of τ (e.g. 0.17). In these cases, 
the agents put a heavy (and perhaps unrealistic) weight on the less recent information 
in the unsophisticated predictor. The experiments show that the switch between the two 
predictors becomes more and more irregular for some small values of β.    26
predictor becomes more and more irregular as the intensity of choice 
increases.  
 
The phenomena first shown by Brock and Hommes (1997) exists in our 
model and confirms the possibility of a rational route to randomness.  
First, as illustrated in the time-series graphs in Figure 5, there exist two 
different patterns. The first pattern is featured in the vicinity of the 
steady state. Most agents then use the cheap predictor. As a result, the 
price dynamics diverges from its steady state value. They will keep 
forming their expectations of the future price from the adaptive predictor 
until it becomes profitable to buy the rational expectations forecast. The 
second pattern is then occurring. Most agents use the rational 
expectations predictor causing a speedy convergence towards the steady 
state. Note that the change between the two patterns is irregular and each 
pattern is more or less lengthy.  
Second, the experiments show that the Lyapunov characteristic exponent 
is positive for large values of the intensity of choice when the adaption 
parameter takes some high or low values, implying the possibility of 
chaotic behaviour in our model. 
 
4. Concluding Comments   27
Our paper shows how relevant the adaption parameter can be in the 
dynamical study of the steady state in the cobweb model with 
heterogeneous beliefs with evolutionary updating. Associated with a set 
of parameters (that notably includes the slopes of supply and demand, 
the intensity of choice between predictors, the cost and the features of 
each predictor), we establish the conditions for local stability and 
instability of the steady state. It allows us to demonstrate the possible 
emergence of stable cycles. In other words, expectations may, by 
themselves and when their formation is modeled as an economic 
decision, be sufficient to generate endogenous fluctuations in this 
evolutionary framework. 
Future research could investigate in a more systematic way how the 
features of the predictors could generate stable periodic equilibria 
consistent with heterogeneous expectations. One could also investigate 
the effects of another type of measure of the welfare associated with a 
certain predictor,  1 + t , j U , in our model. Indeed, one could assume that 
this measure is a weighted average of the two most recent net profits, 
and see if our results change. Numerical simulations could show if this 
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Economics and Finance, St. Andrews, Fife, KY16 9AL, United 
Kingdom 
E-mail: LL5@st-andrews.ac.uk, Tel: 00 44 1334 462 451, Fax: 00 44 
1334 462 444. 
1 See for instance Frankel and Froot (1990) for concerns related to the 
Foreign Exchange Market. 
2 See also Brock and Hommes (1995). 
3 A basic but necessary assumption used in the literature on this topic is 
the local instability of the steady state when all agents use the cheap 
predictor. 
4 Brock used the Samuelson’s boat parable to illustrate this mechanism 
(refer to Brock’s interview by Woodford (2000)). 
5 There is no endogenous switching process, the supply curve is non 
linear. 
6 A similar formulation is also used in the cobweb model of Chiarella 
and He (1998). 
7 The reference to bounded rationality is quite common in the literature 
on heterogeneous expectations. See for instance Tisdell (1996) or 
Hommes (2000).  29
8 The type of rational economic decision-making underlying our model 
is more akin to that of Baumol and Quandt than to that of Simon.  The 
former treats the problem as an optimizing one.  The latter considers it 
as a ‘satisficing’ one.  However, our model includes elements of both 
ideas.   
9 See Proposition 3. For a mathematical exposition of bifurcations, we 
refer to Kuznetsov (2000). 
10 Similar behaviour can be observed for lower values of τ  (e.g. 0.17). 
In these cases, the agents put a heavy (and perhaps unrealistic) weight 
on the less recent information in the unsophisticated predictor. The 
experiments show that the switch between the two predictors becomes 
more and more irregular for some small values ofβ .   
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Proof of Proposition 2 
We just need to study the stability properties of the steady state 
() ( ) () β β Exp 1 1 , 0 , 0 1 + = = n E . The steady state is asymptotically  33
stable when all the absolute values of the real eigenvalues or all the 
modulii of the complex eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix at E are less 
than 1 (Azariadis, 1993)).  
The Jacobian Matrix at E: 















1 1 τ β τ β n A n A J  
In what follows, we will denote  ( ) β 1 n  by  1 n , keeping in mind that the 
relative weight of agents using rational expectations depends on the 
intensity of choice β . 
(i) If  () ( )0 1 4
2
1 < − + τ τ n A  ⇔   ( ) ( )
2
1 1 4 τ τ − − < n A , then there are three 










n A n A n A ∓
.  
Study of  1 λ  





1 1 1 − <
− + − τ τ τ n A n A n A
  
⇔   () ()() ( ) [ ] τ τ τ − + < + 1 4 2
2
1 1 1 n A n A n A  
If  () 0 2 1 < + τ n A  ⇔   ( ) τ 2 1 − < n A , the above inequality is always true 
and then  1 1 − < λ  whatever τ . 
Let us now assume that  ( ) τ 2 1 − ≥ n A  and let us find the conditions for 
which  0 1 1 < < − λ . We have:  34
() ()() ( ) [ ] τ τ τ − + − < − − 1 4 2
2
1 1 1 n A n A n A  
⇔   () ( ) 1 2 1 1 − − > τ n A  if  2 1 > τ  
Note that  ()τ τ 2 1 2 1 − > − −  when  3 2 > τ . 
⇔  () ( ) [] 0 1 2 2 3 < − + − τ τ τ  if  3 2 > τ . 
So we have shown that when  ( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 1 4 1 2 1 2 τ τ τ τ − − < < − − < − n A  
and  3 2 > τ , then  0 1 1 < < − λ . 
 
Study of  2 λ  
It is easy to check that  0 1 2 < < − λ . 
 
(ii) If  () ( )0 1 4
2
1 > − + τ τ n A , then there are three eigenvalues: 0 and 
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Study of the modulus 



















1 2 , 1 < λ  ⇔ () ( ) τ − − > 1 1 1 n A  
Note that  () ( )




Proof of Proposition 3 (we follow Kuznetsov (2000)) 
Our system (S’) is three-dimensional and needs to be rewritten so that 
the steady state is at the origin. 
t t p h = +1      
( ) t t t t n p h p , 1 1 , , φ = +   
( ) t t t t n p h n , 1 1 , 1 , , ϕ = +   
Let us denote  1 , 1 n n m t t − = . Then the system (S’) becomes the following 
system (S1): 
t t p h = +1                          (A.1) 
() 1 1 , , n m p h p t t t t + = + φ         (A.2) 
() ( ) t t t f t t t t m p h n n m p h m , , , , 1 1 ψ ϕ = − + = +        (A.3) 
The steady state is then ( ) 0 0 0 , , . 
Let us denote (S1) as a discrete –time dynamical system:  
() x f x →                                                                               (A.4) 
We can write this system as:  
() x F x J x ~ + = ,  3 R x∈ ,                                                       (A.5) 






2 x O x F  is a smooth function. Let us represent its Taylor 
expansion in the form  36











where  () y , x B  and  () z , y , x C  are multilinear functions.  
 
Let us first consider the Flip case (Proposition 3i). In that case, 
() ( ) 1 2 1 1 − − = τ n A  and  ( ) 1 , 3 2 ∈ τ . 
The Jacobian matrix J of (A.4) at the steady state is: 











− − − − =
0 0 0
0 1 2 1 2 1
0 1 0
τ τ τ τ J  
There are three eigenvalues: 0, -1 and ( ) ( ) 1 2 1 − − τ τ . The 
corresponding critical eigenspace is one dimensional and spanned by an 
eigenvector  3 R q∈  such that  q q J − = , where  ( ) 0 2 1 2 1 , , q
T − = . 
Let  3 R s ∈  be the adjoint eigenvector, that is,  s s JT − = , where  T J  is 
the transposed matrix of J. Normalise s with respect to q such that 
1 = q , s , where  () 0 1 2 1
3 2
2





The bilinear function  ( ) y x B , , defined for two vectors  ( )
T x x x x 3 2 1 , , =  
and  ()
T y y y y 3 2 1 , , =  


































y B x y B x y B x y B x
y B x y B x y B x y B x y x B
m m m m
p p p p   37
where  () () 1
3 , 1 1 n A Bp ′ − = τ ,  ( ) 1
3 , 2 n A Bp ′ =τ ,  ( ) σ τ
2 1 , 1 1 − = m B , 
() σ τ τ − = 1
2 , 1
m B , and  ( ) σ τ
2 2 , 2 = m B ,  
with  []( ) () [ ] ( )
2 2





















We left to the reader to show that none of the elements of  ( ) z y x C , ,  is 
relevant for us.  
 
Following Kuznetsov, the map (A.5) can be transformed to the normal 
form: 
() ( ) 4 3 0 ε ε χ ε ε O ~ + + − = , 
where 
() () () ( ) ( ) ( )
() () f n A q , q B Id J , q B , s q , q , q C , s ′
−
−
















We denote by Id the Identity matrix.  
Thus, the critical normal form coefficient  ( ) 0 χ , that determines the 
nondegeneracy of the Flip bifurcation and allows us to predict the 
direction of bifurcation of the two-period cycle, is always positive when  38
3 2 > τ . Therefore, the Flip bifurcation is nondegenerate and always 
supercritical.  
 
Let us now consider the Neimark-Sacker case (Proposition 3ii). In that 
case,  () ( ) τ − − = 1 1 1 n A  and  2 1 0 < <τ  and  3 2 2 1 < <τ . 
















τ τ J  
There are three eigenvalues: 0 and 
()
() ( )














− = .  J has a simple 
pair of eigenvalues on the unit circle  0
2 1
θ λ i
, e± =  with  π θ π < < 0 2  
and  3 2 0 π θ ≠ . Let  3 C q∈  be a complex eigenvector corresponding to 
1 λ :  
q e q J i 0 θ = ,  q e q J i 0 θ − = ,  
() () () 0 1 , Im i Re , qT λ λ + =  and  () () () 0 1 , Im i Re , qT λ λ − = . Introduce also 
the adjoint eigenvector  3 C s∈  having the properties 
s e s J i T 0 θ − =  and  s e s J
i T 0 θ = , 
and satisfying the normalisation   39
1 = q , s ,  
where  i
i




 is the standard product in  3 C , 








T + − = .  
 
Following Kuznetsov, we know that in the absence of strong resonances, 
i.e.: 
  , eik 1 0 ≠ θ  for  4 , 3 , 2 , 1 = k  
the map (A.5) can be transformed into  
() ( ) ( ) 4 2 0 0 1 u O z z e z ~ i + + = κ
θ ,                       
with  () () 0 Re 0 κ α = , that determines the direction of the bifurcation of a 
closed invariant curve. This real number can be computed by the 
following invariant formula: 










⎡ − + − + =
− − − q q B J Id e q B s q q B J Id q B s q q q C s e




1 2 1 0 0 θ θ α
Therefore, 
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1
τ λ
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L L L n A
 
where  ( ) [] 1 2 1
2 − − − = τ τ τ L  
  40
The coefficient  ( ) 0 α  is always negative when 
() () 3 2 , 59299 . 0 203817 . 0 , 0 ∪ ∈ τ . Therefore, the Neimark-Sacker 
bifurcation is nondegenerate and supercritical on these intervals.  
 
When  5 . 0 = τ , Lasselle et al. (2003) establish that  ( ) 2 − = f n A  and 
3 2 0 π θ = . The stationary equilibrium then undergoes a strong 
resonance 1:3 (see Kuznetsov (2000) p. 397). 
 
When  3 2 = τ , the two curves of the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation and of 
the Flip bifurcation intersect. The steady state has a double –1 
eigenvalue, a codim-2 bifurcation occurs (See Frouzakis et al., 1991, p. 
85).  
Q.E.D.  41
Figure 1: Local Stability of the Steady State 
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Figure 2: Local Stability of the Steady State when B = 0.3 and b = 1.35 
 

















Possibility of Flip bifurcation 
Possibility of Neimark-Sacker bifurcation  42
The E &F Chaos program allows us to draw the following diagrams. 
 
Figure 3: Limit cycle in prices and  107867 0 1 . n =  






















Figure 4: Bifurcation Diagrams 
τ = 0.8, C = 1, B = 0.3, b = 1.35 
 
Figure 4a   Figure 4b 
 
τ = 0.6, C = 1, B = 0.3, b = 1.35 
   
Figure 4c   Figure 4d 
p 
β  β 
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n1 p  45
Figure 5: τ = 0.6, C = 1, B = 0.3, b = 1.35 
β = 7 
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